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INTRODUCTION 
 A man was in a series of altercations with Erika Vigil as several 
neighbors watched. When one of the neighbors tried to take a picture of the 
man with his cell phone, the man robbed him at gunpoint, taking his wallet 
and cell phone. The man fled by car, caused an accident, then fled on foot. 
Two people followed him to a nearby Harmons grocery store, where 
surveillance cameras recorded him entering and leaving the store.  
 Police did not find the man that day. But they knew that Vigil had a 
boyfriend named Reynaldo Martinez; that Martinez matched both 
eyewitness descriptions and the surveillance footage, right down to the facial 
tattoo; that the robbery victim’s wallet was found inside the grocery store; 
-2- 
that a hat at the accident scene had “a lot” of Martinez’s DNA on it and was 
similar to those Martinez wore in Facebook pictures; and that Martinez’s 
fingerprint was inside the car at the accident scene.  
 Martinez raises three claims on appeal.  
 Eyewitness identification. Before trial, no witness had identified 
Martinez as the suspect. At trial, one eyewitness and one police officer said 
that Martinez was the man in the surveillance footage. Martinez faults his 
trial counsel for not objecting to these in-court identifications and other 
identity evidence, for not presenting the jury with a photo lineup, and for not 
requesting an instruction on the limits of eyewitness testimony. These claims 
all fail for lack of prejudice because the evidence of Martinez’s identity was 
overwhelming. But counsel could also reasonably decide not to challenge 
admissible evidence, not to treat the jury as eyewitnesses, and not to seek a 
jury instruction where the evidence of identity was so strong. And counsel 
could have even conceded Martinez’s identity without conceding his guilt, 
because there was evidence of a third-party assailant (“Joey”).   
 Hearsay testimony. Vigil did not testify at trial, but her statements to 
police—which were recorded by a body camera—were admitted at trial. In 
the footage, she identifies a man named “Joey” as her assailant, but does not 
provide further information about him. Martinez claims that his counsel was 
-3- 
ineffective for not objecting to this testimony—that her assailant was 
someone other than Martinez—but this claim fails for lack of prejudice due 
to the overwhelming evidence of Martinez’s guilt. It also fails because defense 
counsel reasonably used this evidence to argue that police had not done 
enough to track down “Joey” and that this raised a reasonable doubt about 
Martinez’s guilt.   
 Cumulative prejudice. Martinez also argues cumulative prejudice from 
five more unpreserved alleged errors: (1) lack of foundation for the Harmons 
surveillance photos; (2) an officer testifying that a witness had identified 
Martinez when the witness had not; (3) one of the jurors knowing one of the 
testifying officers; (4) the trial court allegedly coaching a witness; and (5) an 
officer testifying that he knew Martinez’s father. These claims are 
inadequately briefed. Martinez thus has not met his burden of persuasion on 
appeal. And for each, he can show either no error or no prejudice. Because 
there is no prejudice to accumulate, this claim fails.   
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Was counsel ineffective for (a) not challenging eyewitness 
identification evidence and requesting a Long instruction where DNA, 
fingerprints, surveillance footage, and circumstantial evidence conclusively 
-4- 
established Martinez’s identity; and (b) not challenging hearsay evidence that 
was useful to—and used by—counsel during closing argument? 
 Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law. State v. Griffin, 2016 UT 33, 
¶16, 384 P.3d 186.    
 2. Does cumulative prejudice based on five alleged errors justify 
overturning the jury verdict? 
 Standard of Review. None applies.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts.1 
 One wintry January morning, Mindy Sipes stood on her porch having 
a smoke. R598, 623; SE1 (photo of Sipes). She heard honking and looked about 
four houses down the street, where she saw a girl trying to get out of a white 
car. R598-99; SE3 (map with markers showing relative positions); SE2, 4 
(views of street); SE6 (car). Just then, a man came “running out of the house” 
where the car was parked, “grabbed” the girl, “threw her on the ground and 
started hitting her.” R599. After a minute or two, the girl “got up and took off 
                                              
1 Consistent with appellate standards, the State recites the facts in the 
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶46, 326 
P.3d 645. 
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running.” R600.  The man got into the car and started driving around the 
neighborhood. R602. Sipes ran to her garage, called 911, and got in her car to 
follow him. R605.  
 Sipes said the man appeared to be in his mid-twenties, had “short 
hair,” “a tattoo or something on [the] left side of his face,” and was 5’ 4” or 5’ 
5”. R601. He was wearing “some black baggy sweatpants and a white T-shirt 
and a zipped up gray hoodie.” R601. 
 At about this time, David Barnes was removing the snow from his 
parents’ home nearby when the girl ran up to him. R671; SE10-11 (photos of 
Barnes). She had no coat on and looked “very distraught”—crying, “shaking, 
the whole bit”; she “said she needed help.” R671, 673. She asked to borrow 
his phone to call her mother, and he obliged. R672. She said she was worried 
“about him getting [her] kids,” but refused to call police. R673-74. Just then, 
the man pulled up in the white car. R674. The girl tried—unsuccessfully—to 
hide, and the man yelled at her, “Get in the fucking car, bitch.” R676. Barnes 
tried to take a picture of the car with his cell phone; a “split second” later, the 
man got out of the car and came toward Barnes with a gun. R676-77. The gun 
appeared to be a long-barreled revolver. R677-78.      
-6- 
 Barnes described the man as “slender,” of “medium height,” 5’ 6” or 5’ 
7,” and Hispanic. R685, 692. He was wearing a maroon bandana, a Raiders 
hat and a hoodie. R677.  
 The man pointed the gun at Barnes’s head and demanded his phone 
and wallet. R679-80. Barnes obliged. Id. When a neighbor—Troy Martinez2— 
stuck his head out of his house and said that police were on their way, the 
man ran back to the white car and fled. R682, R1038. As the man left the 
neighborhood, both Barnes and Sipes saw him cause a traffic accident with 
another car. R609, 684; SE3.  
 Seconds after the crash, he jumped out of the car and started running 
toward a nearby Harmons supermarket. R609-09, 615; SE3. No one else was 
in the white car. R628, 657, 791. The driver of the other car, Annie Vu, only 
saw the man from the back, but noted that he was wearing a hoodie. R781. 
As he ran, he left his Raiders hat behind. SE21-22.  
 Two people followed him as he ran. One was Sipes; the other was Lee 
Clay, who had seen the accident while driving. R647-48. They both watched 
him enter the Harmons. R609-10, 651. Clay saw that the man was wearing a 
gray hoodie and black pants, that he had a “[s]mall build,” was “younger,” 
                                              
2 Though he shares the defendant’s last name, nothing in the record 
suggests that the two were related. 
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and had “lots of tattoos,” one on his face. R653-54, 656-57. After five or ten 
minutes, the man came out of the Harmons, but left behind both Barnes’s 
wallet and his image on surveillance footage.3 R685, SE34-48. He ran toward 
a Les Schwab store, at which point Sipes and Clay lost sight of him. R611-12, 
653; SE3.  
 Police found the girl, however. Her name was Erika Vigil. R616; SE12, 
13. She claimed to have “never been” in the neighborhood where they found 
her, and to have no relatives or friends in the area. R1400. She claimed that 
the driver was a black man named “Joey,” but never gave any details about 
him. R389, 702, 769, 854, 923, 948, 1023-25, 1416. She claimed that she had been 
walking to a convenience store in Rose Park or Magna when “Joey” drove by 
and began “yelling at her.” R1401, 1408-10. Because she had “been wanting 
to talk to him” and thought he was “cute,” she got in his car. R1401. When 
“Joey” began to accuse her of being a police informant, she looked for “any 
opportunity” to “jump out of the car and take off” because she “didn’t know 
what this guy was going to do” to her. R1402-03, 1410. It allegedly took her 
about an hour and half to escape. R1411.  
                                              
3 Police had a Harmons employee pull the surveillance footage from 
the time that Clay said he watched the suspect go inside. R939.  
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 Vigil did not cooperate with the investigation; she refused to fill out a 
witness statement, and gave police a non-existent address. R922, 927, 937. 
Police searched for her on Facebook and saw pictures of Vigil with Martinez, 
who had a facial tattoo, a Raiders hat, and looked like the suspect in the 
surveillance footage. R924-25; SE13, 48, 49, 50, 51, 75.4 Both of them were 
friends with a man named Jacob “Stevey” Manzanares, who owned the 
suspect car, but had no facial tattoos and looked nothing like the suspect. 
R919, 921, 926-27; SE20.1, 20.2, 20.3. Though Vigil was Facebook friends with 
a man named Joey, he looked nothing like the suspect and had no visible 
tattoos. R1028-29. An officer went to the home where Sipes had seen the 
whole thing begin, but no one there knew who “Joey” was. R948-49.   
 Forensic evidence confirmed that the suspect was Defendant Reynaldo 
Martinez: the Raiders hat at the crash scene had “a lot” of Martinez’s DNA 
on it, and both his and Vigil’s—but not Manzanares’s—fingerprints were 
found inside the white car. R801-05, 808-09, 815, 1081-85; SE23-27, 72.5  
                                              
4 SE49 and 75 are mirror images, as evidenced by “Raiders” on the hat 
being spelled backwards. See also R930 (officer testifying that SE75 is a 
“mirrored picture”).  
5 Police found Barnes’s cell phone near the scene in the snow, but were 
unable to get any helpful pictures or fingerprints from it. R1019, 1044; SE19.  
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 After police spoke with Vigil’s family and friends to try and figure out 
where she lived, her and Martinez’s Facebook accounts were deleted. R927. 
They later found her living with Martinez and his family. R946. The 
apartment manager confirmed that Vigil and Martinez were “frequently” 
together and used the white car. R893-98; SE76 (car at apartment), compare 
with SE5, 19, 21 (car after crash).  
 Police searched the apartment, including a bedroom that Vigil and 
Martinez shared. R878, 877, 946. There, they found .40 caliber ammunition—
which would fit a long-barreled revolver—as well as a holster and a long-
barreled BB hand gun. R868-69, 876; SE61-63, 66. They did not find the 
revolver. R1065. 
 When police confronted Vigil with the forensic and other evidence, she 
changed her story. She admitted that the man in the Harmons surveillance 
photos was Martinez and that he had been in the car, but claimed that “Joey” 
had been in the car too. R948-51, 1026-27. When police told her to tell the 
truth, she said that they “already knew the truth,” so “what did [they] need 
her for.”6 R949, 1032.   
                                              
6 One officer testified that victims of domestic violence cases can be 
reluctant to cooperate. R859-60. 
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B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
 The State charged Martinez with aggravated robbery, possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and 
domestic violence assault. R337-40. 
 Pre-trial identification attempts. Police showed photo line-ups—which 
included Martinez’s picture—to two witnesses: Barnes’s neighbor Troy, and 
Clay, who had witnessed the traffic accident. R1037. Troy identified another 
man in the lineup as the robber.7 R1038. Clay did not identify anyone in the 
lineup, but went back and forth between Martinez’s picture and another 
picture, trying (unsuccessfully) to settle on one. R1040.   
 Trial identification testimony. At trial, two witnesses said that Martinez 
was the man in the surveillance photos. First, Sipes identified the man in the 
Harmons surveillance stills as the man driving the white car. R616; SE34-37, 
44-47. He had on “exactly” the same clothes, and had the same short hair. 
R617. The prosecutor then asked her if she thought that she “could recognize 
that individual today”; she said yes, and identified Martinez.8  R621. Second, 
                                              
7 Troy was deceased by the time of trial. R1037-38.   
8 Clay said that the man in the surveillance photos was the driver, but 
was not asked to identify Martinez in court. R655. 
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Officer Hill identified Martinez as the man in the surveillance photos. R945. 
Defense counsel did not object to either identification. R621, 945. 
 Body camera footage. The jury saw a video of one officer’s interview with 
Vigil, in which she accuses “Joey” of being the suspect. R853.9 Because Vigil 
did not testify at trial, defense counsel used this evidence—along with a 
stipulation, R389—to argue that the police investigation was inadequate 
because they did not pursue “Joey” enough. R1174-75.  
 The jury convicted Martinez of aggravated robbery and failure to stop 
at the scene of an accident. R381-82.10 The trial court sentenced him to a short 
jail term on the traffic count and five years to life in prison on aggravated 
robbery, with a consecutive term of five to ten years for having a prior violent 
felony conviction involving the use of a dangerous weapon. R1276-78, 1356-
57; see Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.8(4). Martinez timely appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which transferred the case to this Court. R403-08, 411-16.  
                                              
9 The body camera footage was admitted as an exhibit at trial, but not 
sent back with the jury during deliberations. See R843-46. A transcription of 
the video is at R1399-1429, attached as Addendum A. 
10 The parties bifurcated the possession of a dangerous weapon charge 
from the other charges. R998-1001. Because the jury did not find that Martinez 
used an actual gun during the robbery, that count was never sent to the jury. 
R1259-60.   
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Martinez argues that his counsel was ineffective for not challenging 
eyewitness identification evidence, not showing the jury a photo lineup, and 
not getting an eyewitness identification instruction. These claims all fail for 
lack of prejudice because the other evidence of Martinez’s identity was 
overwhelming—DNA, fingerprints, video, and circumstantial evidence 
proved beyond any reasonable doubt that Martinez was the suspect. Further, 
defense counsel could reasonably decide that Martinez’s now-proposed 
alternatives did not have legal support or would not have been very helpful.  
 Martinez next argues that counsel should have objected to the 
prosecutor playing a video of his girlfriend’s police interview because it was 
hearsay. This claim also fails for lack of prejudice, because the evidence of 
Martinez’s guilt was overwhelming. It also fails because counsel reasonably 
used Vigil’s hearsay statements from that interview to argue that “Joey” was 
the real culprit.  
 Martinez finally argues that this Court should reverse for cumulative 
prejudice from five alleged errors. These errors are mostly unpreserved and 
all inadequately briefed. And for each one, Martinez has shown either no 




Martinez has not shown that his counsel was 
ineffective. 
 Martinez argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) not seeking 
to suppress the surveillance pictures and eyewitness identifications or to get 
a Long instruction on factors that might affect the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification, Aplt.Br. 15-24; and (2) not objecting to alleged hearsay on the 
ground that its admission violated the Confrontation Clause, Aplt.Br. 31-34. 
These claims all fail because Martinez cannot prove prejudice where the 
evidence of Martinez’s identity—which included both DNA and 
fingerprints—was overwhelming. But they also fail because he has not 
demonstrated deficient performance.  
 To prove ineffective assistance, Martinez must show both deficient 
performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). If he 
fails to prove either element, his claim fails. Id. at 687, 697.  
For the deficient performance element, Strickland’s guiding principle is 
reasonableness. Id. at 687 (“[T]he proper standard for attorney performance 
is that of reasonably effective assistance.”); see also id. at 688-89; Premo v. 
Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 126 (2011) (similar). So long as counsel acts reasonably, 
-14- 
the defendant has received the sort of assistance that the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees.  
 Mere reasonableness gives counsel a “wide range” to operate in. State 
v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997). The range is wide because “[e]ven the 
best criminal defense attorneys would not” necessarily “defend a particular 
client in the same way,” meaning that there are “countless ways to provide 
effective assistance in any given case.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation 
omitted). In addition, reviewing courts are to “eliminate the distorting effects 
of hindsight” and “evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 
time.” Id. The point of the Strickland analysis is to ensure a fair trial, not to 
“grade counsel’s performance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697, or to weigh 
the relative merits of alternative strategies, State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶¶41-
43, 328 P.3d 841, abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 
¶¶54-55, 391 P.3d 1016. Reasonableness is also not viewed in hindsight, but 
“from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This 
includes the law in effect at the time. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 
(Utah 1993) (“To establish a claim of ineffective assistance based on an 
oversight or misreading of law, a defendant bears the burden of 
demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, . . . 
counsel’s performance was deficient.”) (emphasis added).     
-15- 
Reviewing courts must indulge the “strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This deference also recognizes that, “[u]nlike a later 
reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of 
materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing 
counsel, and with the judge.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 
In short, a defendant cannot prove deficient performance unless she 
proves that “no competent attorney” would have proceeded as her counsel 
did. Moore, 562 U.S. at 124.  
  On the prejudice element, Martinez must show “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
 Proving both deficient performance and prejudice requires actual 
proof—neither can be “a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable 
reality.” State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30, 253 P.3d 1082 (cleaned up). “It 
should go without saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the 
strong presumption that counsel” rendered “reasonable professional 
assistance.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 23 (2013) (citation and quotation 
omitted). Thus, any record gaps are construed in favor of finding both that 
counsel performed adequately and that the defendant suffered no prejudice. 
-16- 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶17, 12 P.3d 92; see also Codianna v. Morris, 660 
P.2d 1101, 1113 (Utah 1983).     
A. Counsel was not ineffective by not challenging the admission 
of surveillance photos and eyewitness identifications and by 
not seeking a Long instruction. 
 Martinez contends that counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
suppress the surveillance photos and the eyewitness identifications. He also 
contends that counsel was ineffective for not asking for a Long instruction on 
the factors that may affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification. 11 
                                              
11 Martinez briefly asserts that counsel should have “present[ed] an 
expert witness” on eyewitness identification. Aplt.Br. 16. This argument is 
inadequately briefed, because he provides nothing but bare assertion to 
support it and does not identify the factors in evidence meriting such 
testimony here. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see, e.g., Rose v. Office of 
Professional Conduct, 2017 UT 50, ¶¶64-66, 424 P.3d 134. It is also speculative 
because he does not identify an expert who would have testified if asked or 
what they would have said, nor moved for remand under rule 23B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to supplement the record with that 
information. Speculation cannot support an ineffective assistance claim. See 
Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30. He thus has not proven deficient performance.  
Martinez also briefly asserts that counsel should have objected on 
hearsay grounds to Officer Hill’s saying what he saw on the video and what 
Clay had said about following the suspect to Harmons. Aplt.Br. 18 (citing 
R939). This claim is conclusory and inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9); see, e.g., Rose v. Office of Professional Conduct, 2017 UT 50, ¶¶64-66, 424 
P.3d 134. It also fails for lack of prejudice as explained above. But reasonable 
counsel could conclude that objecting was baseless because these statements 
were offered to show why his investigation proceeded as it did, not for their 
truth. See Utah R. Evid. 801 (defining hearsay as a statement “offere[d] in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”). 
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These claims fail at the outset because he has not proven prejudice. He also 
has not shown deficient performance.  
1. Martinez cannot show prejudice because the evidence of 
his identity—which included DNA and a fingerprint—was 
overwhelming. 
 Where it is easier for a court to resolve an ineffective assistance claim 
for lack of prejudice, “that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
697. This Court should take that course here. Even if counsel had challenged 
the identification evidence and asked for a Long instruction, it would have 
made no difference. The remaining evidence, and reasonable inferences from 
it, show beyond any doubt that Martinez was the assailant: a large amount of 
his DNA was in the hat that the suspect was wearing and left behind when 
fleeing the accident scene; his fingerprint was inside the car; his girlfriend 
(Vigil) was with him, in a car that they used; and several witnesses confirmed 
that there was no one else in the car during the crimes. R628, 791, 802-05, 897-
98, 1081-86; SE23-27, 72. He fit all the descriptions of the assailant, down to 
the distinctive facial tattoo. R601, 653-57, 685. And Barnes’s wallet—that he 
took during the robbery—was inside the Harmons that he fled to. R685. 
Given this overwhelming evidence, it did not matter that counsel did not seek 
to exclude some evidence, have the jury do a photo line-up, or get a limiting 
instruction on eyewitness identification. There was no probability—let alone 
-18- 
a reasonable one—that the jury would have found differently in light of all 
the other identity evidence.  
 Martinez insists that the identification evidence was “far from 
overwhelming” because Barnes would have been nervous due to the robbery, 
Barnes and Sipes were never shown a photo lineup, Clay never identified the 
man in the car accident, and Vu saw the man only from behind. Aplt.Br. 16-
18. But he ignores the consistency of the descriptions that they gave, the 
forensic evidence, Vigil’s statements and her relationship with him, the 
victim’s wallet being found in the store, and that no other person was seen in 
the car.  
 He also argues prejudice from this ruling because Detective Hill 
identified Martinez as the man in the surveillance photos. Aplt.Br. 18 (citing 
R945). But this would have been cumulative of Vigil’s identifying him. And 
as shown, the forensic and other evidence conclusively showed that it was 
him.  
 This court should affirm for lack of prejudice alone. But he also has not 
shown deficient performance.   
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2. Martinez has not shown that no reasonable attorney would 
have proceeded as counsel did here. 
a.  Counsel could reasonably decide not to challenge 
admissible surveillance photos and not to present a 
photo lineup to the jury. 
 Martinez asserts that defense counsel has a duty to ask the trial court 
to “screen [the] eyewitness identification evidence to determine whether it 
should or should not be admissible at trial.” Aplt.Br. 15. He then asserts that 
the surveillance photos themselves were eyewitness identification testimony. 
Id. at 15-16. Both assertions are wrong. 
 Eyewitness identification evidence is evidence from a person who 
points out someone based on their memory. Because human memory is 
fallible, courts are sometimes required to give a limiting instruction or to 
admit expert testimony on the subject under rule 702 when the defense 
requests it and the evidence merits it. See generally State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 
84, 223 P.3d 1103; State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).  
 But concerns about the fallibility of human memory do not apply to a 
machine’s audio or visual recording of an event. Though such files are stored 
in a computer’s “memory,” their content—unlike human memories—is not 
affected by the passage of time and may be viewed objectively. For this 
reason, audio-visual records concerning a crime are admissible so long as 
they are relevant, there is sufficient foundation for them, and their probative 
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value is not substantially outweighed by the danger for unfair prejudice. See 
Utah R. Evid. 402 (relevant evidence generally admissible), 403 (danger for 
unfair prejudice), 901 (authenticating or identifying evidence); see, e.g., State 
v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, ¶¶29-44, 61 P.3d 1019 (holding videotape of prison 
murder admissible); State v. Wager, 2016 UT App 97, ¶¶10-17, 372 P.3d 91 
(holding foundation sufficient to admit photograph of the defendant using 
drugs).  
 The State is not aware of—and Martinez has not cited—any case or rule 
requiring that video or pictures from the time of the crime are subject to any 
additional rules in order to be admissible. He cites State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 
199, 357 P.3d 20, Aplt.Br. 15-16, but that case involved a person, not a 
machine. He also cites a proposed rule of evidence on eyewitness 
identification. Aplt.Br. 19-24. But this reliance is doubly flawed. First, the 
proposed rule, if adopted, would apply to “eyewitness identification,” not 
machine files.12 See Proposed Utah R. Evid. 617, available at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/utc/rules-comment/wpcontent/uploads/sites 
                                              
12 Though the not-yet-in-effect rule also refers to the admissibility of 
photographs, this is for photos used in “an identification procedure”—like 
mugshots—not photos taken during the crime.  See Proposed Utah R. Evid. 
617(d), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/utc/rules-comment/wp 
content/uploads/sites/31/2018/09/URE-Rule-617-for-comment.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
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/31/2018/09/URE-Rule-617-for-comment.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
Second—as Martinez admits, Aplt.Br. 19—the proposed rule was not in effect 
at the time of trial, and (as of the filing of this brief) has still not been adopted 
by the Supreme Court. Absent rare exception—and Martinez points to none 
here—rules and statutes do not apply retroactively. See generally Harvey v. 
Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, ¶14, 227 P.3d 256. And they certainly do not 
apply until they are adopted. As shown, counsel’s performance is evaluated 
based on the law in effect at the time of trial. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228. Even if 
the “principles” underlying the proposed rule existed at the time of trial, 
Aplt.Br. 24, none of them required exclusion of evidence based solely on 
whether certain procedures were not followed. At very least, reasonable 
counsel could see it that way.   
 Martinez also appears to argue that counsel should have given the jury 
other “realistic choice[s]” to consider—that is, the jury should have been 
given a photo lineup of other men besides Martinez to choose from. Aplt.Br. 
16. But the State is not aware of any case, and Martinez has cited none, 
sanctioning—let alone requiring—in-trial line-ups for non-witnesses. It thus 
fails for the same reasons as above.     
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b. Defense counsel could reasonably decide not to request 
a Long instruction on eyewitness identification. 
 Martinez argues that his counsel was ineffective for not requesting an 
instruction under State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), to explain 
eyewitness identification issues. Aplt.Br. 24-30. Because the evidence of 
Martinez’s identity was so overwhelming, defense counsel could reasonably 
decide not to ask for such an instruction. See, e.g., State v. Heywood, 2015 UT 
App 191, ¶37, 357 P.3d 565 (holding counsel not ineffective for not seeking 
Long instruction where factors did not justify it). Further, because none of the 
witnesses identified Martinez before trial, counsel could reasonably decide 
that there was no reason to seek such an instruction.  
 Martinez asserts that a Long instruction would have been helpful to 
explain the descriptions of the assailant. Aplt.Br. 29-30. But he has cited no 
case—and the State is aware of none—applying eyewitness identification 
factors to suspect descriptions (this is what the person looked like), rather than 
identifications (that is the person).  
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 To the extent that two witnesses identified Martinez at trial—Sipes and 
Detective Hill—they did so right after discussing the photos.13 R621, 945. 
Reasonable counsel could decide that the jury was capable of making the 
same comparison themselves, and that no limiting instruction was necessary. 
Cf. State v. Bowdrey, 2019 UT App 3, ¶¶16-17, 882 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (holding 
that Long does not apply to “real-time” identifications).   
 In sum, Martinez’s claims on eyewitness identification fail because the 
evidence of identification here—which included DNA and fingerprints—was 
overwhelming. And he has not shown that counsel acted unreasonably.   
B. Martinez has not shown that his counsel was ineffective by not 
objecting to hearsay evidence that counsel used to argue third-
party guilt. 
 Martinez next faults his counsel for not objecting when the prosecution 
played a body camera video showing a brief interview with Vigil in which 
she identifies “Joey” as the suspect. Aplt.Br. 31-34. This, he says, violated both 
the hearsay rule and his Sixth Amendment confrontation right. Id. But 
whether something is objectionable is not the issue; the issues are whether 
                                              
13 Martinez asserts that Nathan Evans also did an “in-court 
identification[]” of him. Aplt.Br. 30. This is true, but misleading. Evans was 
the property manager of the apartments where Vigil and Martinez were 
living. R891. He said that Martinez and Vigil were “frequent[ly]” together 
and that they drove the white car. R893-98. He never identified Martinez as 
the suspect. 
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reasonable counsel could decide not to object (he could), and whether it 
reasonably affected the result (it didn’t). See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 
365, 382 (1986). 
 This Court should take the same course that the State recommends on 
Martinez’s other ineffectiveness claims and hold there is no prejudice here. 
The evidence of Martinez’s guilt was overwhelming: his and Vigil’s 
fingerprints were in the car; his DNA was in the suspect’s hat; two people 
followed him to the store where surveillance footage matched his 
appearance, right down to the facial tattoo; he matched every suspect 
description; no witness saw a third person in the car; and Barnes’s wallet was 
found inside the store where Martinez fled. Whatever Vigil said in the body 
camera footage did not materially add to evidence of Martinez’s guilt—
indeed, it was exculpatory. Thus, even if it had not come in, there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have acquitted Martinez.  
 For similar reasons, counsel could reasonably decide not to object. As 
Martinez acknowledges, Aplt.Br. 31-32, counsel used the body cam 
discussion (as well as a stipulation, R389) to argue that the police had not 
done enough to find “Joey,” which showed reasonable doubt. R1174-75, 1182-
83 (defense closing). Though Vigil discussed more than just “Joey’s” alleged 
identity in the video, Aplt.Br. 32-33, she ascribed all the criminal behavior to 
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him, and none of it to Martinez. See R1399-1429. Thus, counsel could have 
reasonably decided that the body camera footage was helpful because it was 
exculpatory. See, e.g., State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶21, 314 P.3d 1014 
(holding counsel did not perform deficiently by not cross-examining alleged 
victim because her testimony was exculpatory).  
 Martinez argues that letting in the body camera footage was 
“particularly questionable” because defense counsel undermined Vigil’s 
credibility by asking whether she was arrested for obstruction of justice. 
Aplt.Br. 33 (citing R1022, 1048). But counsel’s actions were not inconsistent, 
because counsel argued that Vigil’s obstruction was an act of self-
preservation—to protect herself from ”Joey.” R1182 (defense closing).    
II. 
Martinez has not shown cumulative prejudice from 
five largely unpreserved claims because they were 
either not errors or not prejudicial.  
 Martinez finally argues that this Court should reverse for cumulative 
prejudice from five different alleged errors: (1) lack of authentication for the 
surveillance photos; (2) an officer testifying that a witness had identified 
Martinez when the witness had not; (3) one of the jurors knowing one of the 
testifying officers; (4) the trial court allegedly coaching a witness; and (5) an 
officer testifying that he knew Martinez’s father. Aplt.Br. 34-38.  
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 These claims are inadequately briefed. Each consists of a few 
conclusory sentences with little or no analysis, with all five occupying a mere 
page and a half. See Aplt.Br. 35-36. Martinez thus has not carried his burden 
of persuasion on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see, e.g., Rose, 2017 UT 
50, ¶¶64-66. They are also meritless. Because most of these claims are 
unpreserved, he raises them under the rubrics of ineffective assistance and 
plain error. Id. Martinez has shown no error or no prejudice for each one.  
 As explained, to show ineffective assistance, he must prove both 
deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To show plain 
error, he must prove obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶15, 
95 P.3d 276. Though plain error and ineffective assistance are distinct 
doctrines focusing on different actors, their analyses often overlap. See State 
v. Brunn & Diderickson, 2017 UT App 182, ¶39, 405 P.3d 905 (noting that 
obviousness element of plain error and deficient performance element of 
ineffective assistance both depend on law in effect at time of decision). The 
prejudice standard for both doctrines is identical. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, ¶31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92 (explaining that plain error and ineffective assistance 
share a “common” prejudice standard). It is often true that counsel acts 
reasonably by not raising non-obvious errors. See State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 
720 (Utah App. 1997) (“[I]f an error was not obvious to the trial court, it most 
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likely was not obvious to trial counsel.”). And if there is no underlying error, 
both claims necessarily fail. See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶26, 1 P.3d 546 
(“Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”); State v. Gailey, 2015 UT App 249, ¶7, 360 P.3d 805 (“Defendant’s 
claim of plain error is unavailing because there was no error, plain or 
otherwise.”).  
 Further, to reverse on a cumulative prejudice, the Court would have to 
conclude that the combined prejudice from all these alleged errors 
undermines its confidence in the fairness of the proceedings. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
at 1229. That cannot be said here. 
 Martinez first asserts that counsel should have objected that the 
surveillance photos were never properly authenticated. Aplt.Br. 18, 35-36. He 
cannot prove prejudice on this claim because the State was prepared to call a 
witness from Harmons to authenticate them had Martinez objected. See R253 
(State’s witness list); Aplt.Br. 18 (stating that State listed a Harmons employee 
as foundational witness); see, e.g., State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, ¶¶39-45, 365 P.3d 
699 (holding no prejudice from lack of foundation objection where prosecutor 
could have laid foundation if required).  
 Martinez next asserts that Detective Hill “skirt[ed] well-established 
principles of photo lineups by suggesting that Clay had identified” Martinez 
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“when he had not.” Aplt.Br. 18-19, 36. But that was not Hill’s testimony. He 
said merely that two witnesses had thought that Martinez “looked familiar” 
or similar to the suspect, and that Clay had lingered on Martinez’s picture 
and gone back and forth between it and another suspect photo.14 R1011-14, 
1039-40. Reasonable counsel and the court could conclude that there was no 
error, because Clay never said that Martinez was the motorist he saw get into 
the accident with Vu.  
 Martinez next argues that the trial court should have struck a juror who 
had previously worked with one of the testifying officers. Aplt.Br. 36. True, 
one of the witnesses worked with the officer—apparently before he was an 
officer—at Home Depot. R749. Though they were work “acquaintances” 
seven years before, neither supervised the other or did anything socially 
                                              
14 Before trial, the prosecutor stipulated not to go into Hill’s 
observations during photo lineups in which witnesses did not identify 
anyone. R476-77. But during cross-examination, defense counsel elicited 
Hill’s testimony that Troy Martinez and Clay thought that Martinez “looked 
familiar” or similar to the suspect. R1011-14. On redirect, the prosecutor then 
explored the witness’s actions during the line-up. R1039-40. Because defense 
counsel opened the door to the prosecutor’s questions about the lineup and 
Martinez does not argue that counsel was ineffective for doing so, his claim 
fails. Cf. State v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230, 1231 (Utah 1984) (holding that defense 
counsel cannot request a mistrial based on evidence he elicited); State v. 
Cooper, 2011 UT App 412, ¶¶21-22, 275 P.3d 250 (similar); State v. Dominguez, 
2003 UT App 158, ¶¶28, 40, 72 P.3d 127 (similar). And as shown, there is no 
prejudice because the evidence of Martinez’s identity was overwhelming. 
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together. R749-51. The juror said that the relationship would not affect her 
judgment at all. R7521. Defense counsel said he would not move for a 
mistrial, and thought that the officer’s testimony was “fairly mild in nature.” 
R752-53.  
 If counsel did not care, then any error would not have been obvious to 
the trial court. Hall, 946 P.2d at 720. And Martinez has not proven prejudice 
because he has not shown—as he must—that the juror was actually biased. 
See generally State v. King, 2008 UT 54, ¶28, 190 P.3d 1283.  
 Martinez next asserts—in two sentences—that the district court 
“essentially coached a witness” on how to admit evidence. Aplt.Br. 36. But 
the court and counsel could reasonably decide that did not happen. The 
prosecutor was trying to admit evidence that a gun holster was found at 
Martinez’s and Vigil’s apartment. R872. Defense counsel objected that it was 
inadmissible unless the prosecutor “could link it to any gun.” R872-73. The 
prosecutor responded that the revolver was never found, but that the holster 
could “hold a long-barrel gun that was described by the victim.” R873. The 
court responded, “You got somebody who will say that . . . that’s a revolver 
holster? Because it doesn’t look to me like a holster for a revolver.” Id. The 
witness responded that “it does look like it could fit a long-barrel revolver[.]” 
Id. The court clarified: “I will allow it on the testimony that it would fit a long-
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barreled gun and possibly a revolver. If you can’t say that, I won’t.” Id. The 
witness responded, “I can say that, yeah.” Id. Defense counsel then withdrew 
his objection, and the holster evidence came in.15 R874, 878. 
 Reasonable counsel and the court could decide that there was no 
coaching—the court merely said what foundation was necessary for an 
exhibit under a defense objection that was then resolved. Martinez has shown 
no error, let alone obvious error, nor deficient performance. And there was 
no prejudice from the holster where the jury did not find that Martinez used 
an actual gun to commit the crime.  
 Finally, Martinez argues that he was prejudiced by an officer 
mentioning that he knew Martinez’s father. Aplt.Br. 36. This claim is 
preserved, but cursorily briefed. One of the officers executing the warrant 
was asked who was at the apartment when he got there; as he listed off 
people, he said that “Reynaldo Martinez, Senior, who I do know well,” was 
there, along with Senior’s girlfriend, Vigil, and a young girl. R881. Defense 
counsel later moved for a mistrial, saying that the “who I do know well” 
remark was “inappropriate” and “likely to prejudice” the defense. R904-07. 
The prosecutor said that he did not even hear the “who I do know well” 
                                              
15 The witness also said that the holster could fit the BB gun found at 
the apartment. R874. 
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portion, and that it was unlikely to prejudice Martinez where the testimony 
was not about him. R908-09. The trial court denied a mistrial, ruling that the 
comment was not the State’s fault because it came out on cross-examination, 
and that there was no prejudice where the comment was brief, was not 
objected to, and concerned someone other than the defendant. R910-11.   
 Even if the remark were error, Martinez cannot show prejudice for the 
reasons the trial court denied the mistrial motion. See, e.g., State v. Yalowski, 
2017 UT App 177, ¶¶17-22, 404 P.3d 53 (holding that remarks do not require 
mistrial if the prosecutor does not elicit them, they are “brief, made in 
passing,” and “likely had no effect on the verdict”).   
 Because Martinez has shown either no error or no prejudice from each 
of his cursory claims, he has not shown cumulative prejudice. See, e.g., State 
v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶¶39-49, 428 P.3d 1038. 
CONCLUSION 
 Martinez faults his trial counsel for not challenging eyewitness 
testimony, but admissible evidence of Martinez’s identity was 
unchallengeable, as it included DNA, fingerprint, video, and strong 
circumstantial evidence. He also faults his counsel for not objecting to 
hearsay, but does not acknowledge that it was useful to—and used by—the 
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defense. Finally, he cursorily argues a number of alleged errors that were 
either not errors or not prejudicial. This Court should affirm.  
 Respectfully submitted on February 25, 2019. 
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